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N Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,I the Fifth Circuit sitting en
.banc announced a controversial new test for evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence. An earlier panel decision reversed a summary judgment for the defendant chemical
manufacturers, holding that the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert
regarding cancer causation was not so fundamentally unreliable
that it should be excluded from jury consideration. 2 On rehearing en banc, a divided court disagreed with the panel decision and
affirmed the district court's summary judgment rendered on behalf of the chemical manufacturers. 3 In its en banc opinion, the

Fifth Circuit announced a new test for analyzing the admissibility
© Copyright 1992 by Richard 0. Faulk Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. All
Rights Reserved
t Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, Houston, Texas. J.D., 1977, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. Board Certified, Civil Appellate Law, Texas
Board of Legal Specialization. Member, Texas Association of Civil Trial and
Appellate Specialists. The author has previously published portions of this article in Richard 0. Faulk, Paoli and Christophersen: A ComparativeAnalysis, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1173 (Feb. 26, 1992).
1. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
2. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990),
vacated, 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
3. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1116. The Fifth Circuit found that the district
court did not err in excluding plaintiffs' expert testimony that exposure to cadmium and nickel fumes led to Albert Roy Christophersen's carcinoma, where the
expert (Dr. Miller) testified that the kinds of evidence most often used to establish causation are human epidemiological studies, live animal testing, and in vitro testing, but that he did not follow this methodology. Id. at 1115. Plaintiffs'
expert presumed that nickel and cadmium exposures associated with small-cell
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of scientific proof under the Federal Rules of Evidence.4
In general, the court required experts to base their opinions
upon facts which are reasonably relied upon by experts in their
field. 5 The court also required the opinions to be derived
through generally accepted scientific methods. 6 Despite a concerted attempt to resolve general scientific evidence issues, the
Christophersen court left many important questions unanswered.
Most importantly, the court did not provide district courts with
any guidance for cases where the experts disagree concerning the
necessity for certain facts or the appropriateness of particular
methodologies.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

Christophersen concerned the admissibility of the plaintiffs' expert's testimony regarding the causal connection between exposure to cadmium and colon cancer. 7 Since the plaintiffs had only
one expert who testified about this connection, their causation
case depended entirely upon the admissibility of his opinions. 8 In
deciding that the opinion of the plaintiffs' expert should be excluded because it was unreliable, the district court emphasized
the insufficiency of exposure evidence. 9 The plaintiffs' expert
carcinoma of the lungs are likely to be associated with small cell carcinoma elsewhere in the body. Id.
4. Id. at 1110.
5. Id. at 1111.
6. Id. "As long as the expert's methodology is well founded, the nature of
the expert's conclusion is generally irrelevant." Id.
7. Id. at 1108. In 1986, Christophersen died as a result of a rare, small-cell
form of cancer that originated in his colon and metastasized to his liver. Id.
During the 14 years preceding his death, Christophersen worked for Marathon,
a plant that produces nickel/cadmium batteries. Id. Although Christophersen
was not directly involved in the production of the batteries, his job duties did
require him to visit the plant area where the batteries were manufactured. Id.
Christophersen was allegedly exposed to nickel and cadmium fumes on these
visits. Id. Christophersen's surviving spouse and child, the plaintiffs, contended
that these fumes contained particles of nickel and cadmium, and that the exposure caused the cancer that resulted in his death. Id.
8. Christophersen, 902 F.2d at 364. The district court weighed "Dr. Miller's
affidavit as the only evidence supporting plaintiffs' claim of causation ...
Therefore, if the district court properly determined that Dr. Miller's conclusion
should be excluded, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate." Id.
9. Id. at 365. The district court analyzed Dr. Miller's opinion under Federal
Rule of Evidence 703. Rule 703 reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particularfield informing opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
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conceded that the level and duration of exposure were "important considerations when evaluating the effect of exposure to a
toxic substance."' 0 The court, however, found that the expert
had relied almost entirely on incomplete or inaccurate exposure
data from an affidavit by one of the defendant's former employees." For example, the affidavit did not describe the chemical
composition or concentrations of the fumes to which the decedent was exposed.' 2 The expert had no information regarding
the size of the workplace or its ventilation characteristics.' 3
The expert also made significant factual errors by overstating
the decedent's duration of exposure.' 4 Apparently, the expert
merely assumed the decedent was exposed to sufficient levels of
cadmium without any objective evidence of dosage and inaccurate
evidence of duration. Additionally, although the expert acknowledged the importance of animal, in vitro, and epidemiologic studies in determining causation, he did not rely upon any of those
methods in reaching his opinions.' 5 Rather, his conclusions were
based upon general references to unspecified medical literature,
the plaintiffs' medical records, and the expert's personal experience and training.16
Based upon these inconsistencies, the district court held that
the expert's opinion was.unreliable as a matter of law.' 7 According to the district court, the expert's testimony failed to satisfy the
mandate of Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires the facts and data supporting an expert's opinions to be
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts" in his particular
FED. R. EvID. 703 (emphasis added).

10. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1113.
11. Id. The district court found that virtually all of plaintiffs' expert's data
came from the affidavit of a Marathon employee named Edgar Manoliu. Id.
12. Id. The affidavit was lacking of any "information about the type of
fumes to which Christophersen was exposed or the type of fumes generated by
the battery manufacturing process." Id.
13. Id. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Miller, was not informed "as to the physical
facilities at the Marathon plant, including the size of the plant or the impregnation and soak area, or the ventilation available in these areas or in Christophersen's office." Id.
14. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1113. Dr. Miller's opinion assumed that
Christophersen had worked in the plant for 20 years when in fact he had only
worked there for the 14 years preceding his death. Id.
15. Id. at 1115.
16. Id. Plaintiffs' expert merely had a "scientific hunch... [which is] inadequate to support a judgment in favor of Christophersen." Id.
17. Id. at 1116. For a discussion of the district court's analysis, see supra
notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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field.' 8 Since the expert agreed that dosage was an important
consideration in determining causation, his inability to quantify
accurately the nature or timing of exposure demonstrated that his
opinion was not based on facts "reasonably relied upon" by experts in his field.' 9
Initially, a panel of three judges of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. 20 According to the panel, the district court failed to give
proper deference to the role of the jury in evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses. The panel emphasized that "questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert's opinion affect the
weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility
and should be left for the jury's consideration. ' 2 1 According to
the panel, the opinion should be disregarded only if it is fundamentally unsupported and "would not actually assist the jury in
arriving at an intelligent and sound verdict." 22 In view of the apparent conflicts between the panel's decision and previous Fifth
Circuit precedents, the manufacturers moved for a rehearing en
23
banc.
II.

A

BACKGROUND OF CONFLICTING PRECEDENTS

The Fifth Circuit's en banc reconsideration of the panel's decision was not unexpected. For some time, a number of the Fifth
Circuit's judges have been concerned with the difficulties posed
by the role of experts and scientific proof.24 For this reason, the
rehearing attracted a number of amicus curiae briefs from organizations such as the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Products
Liability Advisory Council, and the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice. 25 Consistent withJudge Higginbotham's concerns in Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,26 the briefs submitted on behalf
of the manufacturers expressed concern over "the role of experts
18. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1113.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 1109. This panel held that plaintiffs' expert's "opinion was not so
fundamentally unreliable that the jury should not consider it." Id.

21. Christophersen, 902 F.2d at 364.
22. Id.
23. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1109.
24. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168-

70 (5th Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046
(1990). Higginbotham dissented because of preference for en banc resolution
of scientific evidence dispute.
25. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1108.
26. 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
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in the federal courts, including whether we should accept opinions of experts not based upon a generally accepted scientific
principle." 2 7 Additionally, they echoed Judge Higginbotham's
"more broadly stated concern that substantive principles such as
tort law are not handling science issues in a rational manner." 28
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit could not approach this issue
afresh. In a number of earlier cases, the court rendered some difficult, case-specific decisions. 29 Prior cases had required an expert to do more than state his credentials and a subjective
opinion. 30 Beyond this general requirement, however, the Circuit's opinions are blurred. Each case seemed to turn upon its
respective panel's view of the scientific data. Some endorsed a
battle of the experts, while others viewed such conflicts with distaste. 3 ' Although the Christophersen panel reached their result by
27. Id. at 168. On October 13, 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to hear Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3061. This case contains the same fact situation
(birth defects caused by ingestion of a prescribed drug during pregnancy) and
legal issue (how must expert opinion and methodology be substantiated in order
to be admissible) as Brock. In Daubert, the parents of two children born with limb
defects sued the manufacturer of the anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, for causing
the birth defects. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1129. Plaintiffs' causation evidence consisted primarily of an expert opinion based on "in vitro and in vivo animal tests,
chemical structure analyses and the reanalysis of epidemiologicalstudies." Id. (emphasis added). Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals presented expert opinions that of
the more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients, no statistically significant association between Bendectin and birth defects had been
demonstrated. Id. The district court granted summary judgment, deciding that
the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that Bendectin caused the
children's birth defects. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the plaintiffs'
expert's methodology using the Frye test. Id. "For expert opinion based on a
given scientific methodology to be admissible, the methodology cannot diverge
significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the
field." Id. The court found that "reanalysis of epidemiological studies" is only a
"generally accepted scientific technique" when it is subjected to verification and
scrutiny by others in the field. Id. at 1130-31. Since the expert's opinion had
not been subjected to such scrutiny, the court affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment. Id.
28. Brock, 884 F.2d at 168-69.
29. See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987) (expert
opinion that is supported solely by credentials and subjective opinion is not admissible); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972) (expert testimony can rely on facts or data not admitted into evidence if they are of type reasonably relied upon within expert's
community).
30. See Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 424 (affirming summary judgment for manufacturer when opinion lacked foundation and reliability necessary to support expert
testimony).
31. Compare Osburn v. Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988) (jury determination of dueling expert
testimony regarding leukemia causation by chloramphenicol) with Brock v. Mer-
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ineffectively distinguishing Brock, 32 the en banc court attempted
to reconcile the circuit's ostensibly inconsistent precedents."
The court did so by creating a four-part test for admissibility.
III.

THE CHRISTOPHERSEN STANDARDS

According to the en banc court, a district court confronted
with expert testimony must make the following determinations
34
before admitting the testimony into evidence:
(A)
(B)

(C)
(D)

whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion;
whether the facts upon which the expert relies are
the same type as are relied upon by other experts in
the field;
whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used
a well-founded methodology; and
whether the testimony's potential for unfair prejus5
dice substantially outweighs its probative value.

Although the court insisted that this test does not introduce any
"new concepts into our jurisprudence," 3 6 the ultimate holding is
indeed something completely different. In a real sense, this new
test is a patchwork quilt which pieces the Federal Rules, Viterbo,
Osburn, and Brock together with a surprising old thread - the "gen37
eral acceptance" test of Frye v. United States.
Frye was the seminal case regarding the admissibility of scienrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d

167 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990) (insisting upon conclusive
epidemiologic proof before allowing recovery for birth defects allegedly caused
by Bendectin).
32. Christophersen, 902 F.2d at 367.
33. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1111.
34. Id. at 1110. The court sets out this framework for trial judges struggling with expert testimony from Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, and
from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Christophersen, 939

F.2d at 1110.
35. Christopherson, 939 F.2d at 1110.
36. Id. The court said that the four steps were "guideposts drawn from the

Federal Rules of Evidence and [their] cases." Id.
37. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court stated that the time
when a "scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is .. .somewhere in . . . [the] twilight zone." Id. at

1014. The court went on to state that although "courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established ..... Id. The court held that the systolic blood pressure test was not

established well enough by physiological and psychological authorities to be admitted. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol4/iss1/2
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tific evidence. It initiated the requirement that, as a prerequisite
to admissibility, a scientific principle or discovery "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 38 Until Christophersen, the
continued viability of Frye after the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence was an open question. Certainly, the Fifth Circuit had never applied Frye in a toxic tort context, citing it instead
to disallow opinions based on novel scientific techniques, such as
voice-stress analysis and hypnosis.3 9 Indeed, the court had categorically stated that, in a toxic tort case, "the absence of a scientific consensus on a given theory does not affect the admissibility
of an expert's opinion."' 40 Despite this history, the Christophersen
court cited and applied Frye to determine whether the expert's
testimony was based upon a "well-founded methodology."-4 ' As
the dissent in Christophersen asserted, and as the majority intimated, an evaluation of methodology is in reality a review of the
expert's "study and the reasons for his opinion." 4 2 The evaluation is designed to ensure that experts reach their conclusions
through rational thought processes, rather than speculations.
In applying this new test, the court did not seriously question
the plaintiffs' expert's qualifications, except to note that the district court had the right to scrutinize the expert's "lack of specialized experience and knowledge." 43 Moreover, the court did not
emphasize the role of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which generally permits courts to exclude otherwise admissible testimony because of the danger of "unfair prejudice. '44 According to the
court, Rule 403 merely serves a "general screening function." 4 5
The court focused on the second and third inquiries, namely, the
38. Id.at 1014.
39. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1132 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
40. Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 935 (1989).
41. Christophersen,939 F.2d at 1115. The court said that when analyzing the
validity of an expert's methodology, the court should apply the "Frye test:
whether the methodology or reasoning that the expert uses to connect the facts
to his conclusion is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community."
Id.
42. Id. at 1133.
43. Id. at 1112-13. Even though the district court scrutinized the expert's
experience and knowledge, the expert's testimony was excluded under Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 and the Frye methodology test. Id. at 1115-16.
44. Id.at 1116. Under Rule 403, a court can exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
FED. R. EvID. 403.
45. Christophersen,939 F.2d at 1112.
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sufficiency of the facts upon which the opinions were based, and
the reliability of the expert's methodology.
Although these factors are stated separately in the court's
opinion, they are difficult to distinguish in its analysis. The critical part of the opinion deals with the expert's admission that accepted methodology requires a consideration of dosage and his
46
subsequent expression of an opinion without such evidence.
According to the court,
[i]f the dosage of the harmful substance and the duration
of exposure to it are the types of information upon which
experts reasonably rely when forming opinions on the
subject, then the district court was justified in excluding
Dr. Miller's opinion that is based upon critically incom47
plete or grossly inaccurate dosage or duration data.
Regarding this issue, the court apparently concluded that,
although the expert acknowledged that certain facts should be
considered before reaching a toxicologic conclusion, he lacked
sufficient data to reach a reliable conclusion regarding the decedent. 4 8 As a result, his specific causation opinion regarding the
individual decedent was not based upon facts upon which "ex49
perts in the field" reasonably rely.
On the issue of general causation, namely, whether exposure
to cadmium is capable of causing colon cancer, the court applied
the third, or Frye, test. 50 By this inquiry, the court asked whether
the methodology or reasoning process used by the expert in
reaching his opinions was "generally accepted" in the scientific
community. 5 ' Significantly, the existence of a standard methodology was not disputed. Although the expert testified that human
epidemiological studies, live animal testing, and in vitro testing
were the primary kinds of evidence "most often used to establish
causation," 52 his ultimate opinions did not rely on any of these
methods. 53 Rather, the expert relied, without citation of specific
46. Id. at 1113. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
47. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1114.
48. Id.at 1114-15.
49. Id.at 1115.

50. Id.The court said that the way to analyze the validity of an expert's
methodology "is by applying the Frye test .
Id.
51. Id.
52. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115.
53. Id. The district court found it inconsistent that the expert concluded
that these were the primary kinds of evidence used to establish causation, but
that the expert did not effectively rely upon any of them. Id.
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medical authorities or literature, upon the medical records, re54
search literature, and the expert's education and experience.
The en banc court concluded that, as a matter of law, the expert's
reasoning did not follow the "generally accepted" or "wellfounded" methodology. 5 5 As the court stated, "All Dr. Miller
had was a scientific hunch, which as far as the record shows, no
one else shares. This was enough to support further investigation
but was inadequate to support a judgment in favor of Christophersen. ' '5 6 Under this holding, causation opinions based
upon hypotheses which cannot be rationally confirmed through
generally accepted epidemiologic or toxicologic methods are
inadmissible under the Frye test.
Thus, the majority opinion in Christophersen can be condensed
into two basic holdings. First, in determining causation in a particular individual, experts must base their opinions on facts which
are reasonably relied upon by other experts in their field. 5 7 If
certain facts are essential to the standard analysis, such as dose
levels and duration, the expert must develop those facts accurately and must consider them in his analysis. If these facts are
not properly developed and considered, the expert's opinion
must be excluded. Secondly, the expert's causation opinions
must be derived through generally accepted toxicologic or epidemiologic methods. 58 If an expert acknowledges the significance
of methods such as animal studies, in vitro studies or epidemiologic reviews, but fails to apply them in his analysis, his opinion is
legally unreliable and must be excluded.
IV.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Unfortunately, these are not bright line tests, and Christophersen probably raises as many new questions as it answers. For example, what predicate must be laid down before a court
concludes that the expert's facts are of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field? What showing must be
made to prove that the expert's methodology is generally accepted? What happens when the experts themselves disagree regarding the need for certain facts, or whether a particular
54. Id. at 1124 (Reavley, J., dissenting). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 1115-16.

56. Id. at 1115.
57. For a relevant discussion, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
58. Id. For a relevant discussion, see supra notes 49-55 and accompanying
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methodology has been generally accepted? In Christophersen, all of
the experts apparently agreed regarding the necessity of certain
exposure evidence and the relevance of certain specific methodologies. 59 This simplified the analysis substantially. However, what
about the next case, which will surely arise, where the expert testimony conflicts on these threshold points? Is an evidentiary or in
limine hearing required to determine these controversies and, if
so, what guideposts should the district court apply in weighing
the expert's credibility at such a hearing? These important questions are not answered by Christophersen. Therefore, one suspects
that Christophersen is not the Fifth, Circuit's last word on scientific
evidence.
V.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING VIEWS

Christophersen was not a unanimous opinion. 60 The concurring and dissenting opinions were generally consistent in their
disapproval of the majority's reliance on Frye and their insistence
that the new test could not be justified under Rules 702 and
703.61 In his concurrence, Chief Judge Clark asserted that the
danger of unfair prejudice was alone sufficient to justify excluding
the expert's testimony under Rule 403.62 The dissenters severely
criticized the majority's decision as denying plaintiffs' "right to
trial by jury, and eliminating substantive rights in tort cases where
federal courts have only diversity jurisdiction. ' 63 As the dissenters saw the controversy, "the jury represents neither the ideal arbitration of scientific conflict, nor its permanent resolution, but
simply the essential voice of the community in solving one problem fairly brought before it." 64 They did not see the issue in
terms of good or bad science, stating "Let the experts settle the
59. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115. Both plaintiffs' expert witness and defendant's expert witness agreed as to the kinds of evidence used to establish
causation. Id. However, plaintiffs' witness did not rely upon these kinds of evidence. Id.
60. Seven judges contributed to the majority opinion; the ChiefJudge filed
a concurring opinion; four judges joined in a dissent. Id.
61. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1119-20, 1129-34 (Clark, CJ., concurring and
Reavley, J., dissenting, respectively).
62. Id. at 1121-22. Chief Judge Clark stated that the expert's testimony
passed Rules 702 and 703. Id. at 1121. However, since there was no manifest
error in the district court's ruling that the expert's testimony was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,Judge Clark did not reverse. Id. at

1122.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1128. The dissenters noted that the resolution of the evidentiary
conflict in this case requires but "attentive common sense." Id. at 1129.
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larger dispute in due time; we have cases to resolve." 65 Of
course, such remarks assume the question. There simply is no
case to resolve in the absence of rational scientific evidence. The
majority's opinion holds that in the absence of a reasoned analysis
based upon accurate facts and sound methods, there is no evidence for a jury to evaluate. 66 Of course, cases can be resolved
while the larger issue remains undecided, but without a rational
scientific basis, the cases must be dismissed, rather than proceeding to trial.
VI.

CONFLICTS WITH PAOCLI

Christophersenconflicts with the Third Circuit's opinion in In re
Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.6 7 Although the Third and Fifth
Circuits did not differ substantially regarding expert qualifications, factual reliability, or prejudice issues under Rule 403, the
courts diverged when they addressed the issue of methodologic
reliability. Although both courts focused upon the reliability of
the methodologies underlying the expert's opinions, they evaluated reliability in different ways. While Paoli asked whether an
expert's methodology was sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the
jury, 6 8 Christophersen required a showing that the methodology was
"generally accepted". in the field. 69 Unfortunately, neither court
emphasized specific factors or considerations which a district
court should consider in determining accuracy or general
acceptance.
65. Id. at 1128-29.
66. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1136 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
67. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). In
Paoli, the plaintiffs were 38 people who had worked or lived near the Paoli railyard. Id. at 835. Plaintiffs' main claim was that they had contracted illnesses from
exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Id. The defendants were the
Monsanto Corporation, a leading producer of PCBs; General Electric Company,
manufacturer of transformers; Amtrak, owner of the railyard between 1976 and
1983; Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority, owner of the railyard since
1983; and the City of Philadelphia, which owned some of the railroad cars at the
railyard. Id. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all
claims except for those for property damage and CERCLA response costs. In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when plaintiffs' improperly excluded
experts' testimony is considered, general issues of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiffs had been exposed to PCBs, and whether PCBs had caused
plaintiffs' injuries. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 862.
68. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857. The court held that the district court could not
exclude an expert's report on the ground that it had "not been peer-reviewed or
accepted by anyone in particular ....
Id. at 857-58.
69. Christophersen,939 F.2d at 1115. See supra discussion accompanying note
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In Paoli, the court applied the standards it enunciated in earlier decisions, most notably United States v. Downing 70 and DeLuca
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 71 Under Downing, a court which
is ruling on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence must
conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine the "soundness and
reliability of the process or technique used in generating the evidence."' 72 According to DeLuca, the court must give due deference to the "strong and undeniable preference" of the Federal
Rules of Evidence for "admitting any evidence having some po73
tential for assisting the trier of fact."
Relying on these precedents, the Paoli court evaluated the
proposed evidence under a standard of helpfulness.7 4 This
"helpfulness" standard "turns on whether the expert's 'technique
or principle [is] sufficiently reliable so that it will aid the jury in
reaching accurate results.' "75 The key element of this "helpfulness" standard is accuracy. Although the court noted that the
"reliability inquiry must be flexible and may turn on a number of
factors,"' 7 6 it recognized that an opinion is excludable if its methodology is so fundamentally unreliable that it does not render accurate results. As the court stated: "[I]f there were evidence in
this record that meta-analysis is inaccurate as a mode of analysis that the concept of combining raw data from different independent studies and re-analyzing it in total does not render accurate
70. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.). The Third Circuit ruled that the district court
had erred in refusing to admit testimony of a defense psychologist, an expert in
the field of human perception and memory. Id. at 1226. Downing stands for the
rule that admissible scientific techniques must: (1) be reliable, (2) not mislead
juries, and (3) have a sufficient connection to the specific factual issues in the
case. Id.
71. 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). Parents of an infant born with severe defects sought damages for those defects, allegedly caused by the use of a morning
sickness drug. Id. at 943. The Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling,
holding that epidemiological studies showing that the drug caused the defects
were the type of data a reasonable expert would rely upon, and were therefore
admissible. Id.
72. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
73. DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 956. The court stated that Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 (relating to relevance), 403 (relating to undue prejudice),
and Rules 701-703 (relating to expert testimony) provide that evidence with any
marginal utility should be admitted, absent a substantial countervailing concern.
Id.
74. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857.
75. Id. (citing DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 1235, quoting 3 J. WEINSTEIN ET AL.,

702[03], at 702-35).
76. Id. at 857 (citing Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238). The court, however, declined to set the exact level at which a district court may determine that a technique is sufficiently unreliable. Id.
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
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results - then there might be grounds for excluding meta-analysis." 7 7 In view of the absence of evidence challenging the accuracy of meta-analysis as a general principle, the Paoli court viewed
the meta-analysis controversy as a dispute over the probative
value of a specific study, not an argument over the overall reliabil78
ity of meta-analysis as a scientific technique.
Although the Paoli court recognized that general challenges
to the reliability of disputed methodologies must be resolved by
the judge before the evidence is admitted, the court emphasized
that challenges to opinions generated from accepted methodologies must be resolved as fact issues by the jury. 79 As the record
did not demonstrate that meta-analysis was an unreliable scientific technique, the case resolved into a battle of the experts over
the value of a particular piece of evidence. Traditionally, the out80
comes of such battles are determined by the trier of fact.
Unfortunately, despite the Paoli court's concern for accuracy,
it provides very little guidance for determining just how much accuracy is required. Although the court seems content to leave the
question open to an unspecified number of factors relevant to the
facts of each particular case, a careful reading of Paoli's precedents provides more information. In Downing, the principal Third
Circuit decision regarding scientific evidence before Paoli, the
court set forth some specific factors to be considered in the reliability analysis. 8 ' These include:
(A)

(B)

the "novelty" of the new technique and its relationship to more established modes of scientific
analysis;
the existence of specialized literature which deals
with the new technique;

77. Id.
78. Id. at 858. "What we have, therefore is a record that shows significant
disagreement about whether this particular meta-analysis is reliable." Id.
79. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857. The court noted that the "reliability requirement" of Rule 702 must not be used by the courts as a tool to exclude all questionable evidence. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence "embody a strong and
undeniable pretence for admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact ......
Id. (quoting DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 956).
80. Id. at 858. The court said that if a reliable methodology were substantially altered, the Downing standard would apply. However, "if the challenged
procedure is more accurately described as an application of an accepted methodology, it is not the proper subject of a Rule 702-based exclusion, but is rather
the subject of cross-examination of the expert and resolution by the jury." Id.
81. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
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(C)

whether the new technique has been exposed to.
critical scientific scrutiny;
(D) the qualifications and professional stature of the
expert witnesses advancing the technique;
(E) the non-judicial uses of the technique;
(F) the frequency with which the new technique leads
to erroneous results, considering both the fre82
quency and types of errors generated.
As this analysis reveals, the Third Circuit does not exclude
peer review as a factor for determining the reliability of methodologies, as opposed to ultimate opinions. 83 Cumulatively considering the factors set forth in Downing, it seems clear that Paoli's
emphasis on accuracy suggests, at the very least, predictability. If,
for example, counsel demonstrates that animal studies do not accurately predict carcinogenicity in specific human tissues, a court
may determine that animal studies are not sufficiently accurate to
meet Paoli's reliability threshold.
In Christophersen, the court hinged "reliability" upon whether
the expert's opinion was derived from a methodology which was
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field to which it belongs." 8 4 This reasoning is derived
from Frye, a case which rejected the use of evidence resulting
from a systolic blood pressure test.8 5 Frye was the seminal case
regarding the standards for evaluating expert opinions derived
from novel scientific techniques.8 6 As in Paoli, this test applies
only to methods, not ultimate opinions. As long as the methodology is generally accepted, "the nature of the expert's conclusion
87
is irrelevant, even if it is controversial or unique.
Unfortunately, the Christophersen court failed to set forth the
factors which a trial court may appropriately consider in determining whether a methodology is generally accepted. This was
82. Id. at 1238-39. The court proposed a flexible reliability inquiry, based
on these considerations. Id. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EviDENCE 702[03], at 702-18 (providing exhaustive list of factors to be considered
in reliability evaluation).
83. See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857-58 (noting that expert's opinions need not be
subjected to peer review in published journals).
84. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1111 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014). The
court expanded, saying that "as long as the expert's methodology is well
founded, the nature of the expert's conclusion is generally irrelevant ....
Id.
85. United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

86. For a brief discussion of Frye, see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text.
87. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1111.
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because the existence and appropriate use of certain generally accepted methodologies was undisputed. In Christophersen, the experts for both sides agreed that epidemiology studies, animal
studies, and in vitro tests were the primary techniques used to
establish causation.8 8 Despite this consensus, the plaintiffs' expert witness did not derive his opinions from any of these methods. 89 Rather, he generally relied upon the decedent's medical
records, research literature, and his education and experience. 90
The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the expert's opinion
was inadmissible because his reasoning did not follow the generally accepted methodologies. 9 '
Thus, neither Paoli nor Christophersen confronted a situation
where there was conflicting evidence regarding the reliability of
the appropriate methods used to reach a causation opinion. In
Paoli, there was no evidence that, as a general principle, metaanalysis was an unreliable scientific technique. 9 2 In Christophersen,
there was no dispute that, in reaching a causation opinion, experts should rely upon epidemiology, animal studies, or in vitro
testing. 93 Thus, neither court was forced to analyze a record
where the experts disagreed on the reliability of a particular
methodology. Nevertheless, unlike Paoli's "accuracy" test, Christophersen's "general acceptance" standard has a long history of
precedents. 94 These precedents allow one to forecast the manner
in which the Fifth Circuit may determine whether a particular
technique is "generally accepted."
Since Frye was decided in 1923, the principal source for evaluating the "general acceptance" of a particular technique has
been the evolving scientific literature. Courts which have followed the Frye rule have regularly required plaintiffs to justify
novel methodologies by showing a consensus in published arti95
cles. As the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Shirley:
88. Id. at 1115. Both plaintiffs' expert witness and defendant's expert witness agreed as to the kinds of evidence used to establish causation. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. For a relevant discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
91. Id. at 1116.
92. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857.
93. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115.
94. See, e.g., Osburn v. Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988); United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
95. People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1982). In Shirley, the court concluded that the testimony of a witness given after she had undergone hypnosis
for the purpose of restoring her memory should not be admitted into evidence.
Id. at 776.
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[T]he burden is on the proponent of the new technique
to show a scientific consensus supporting its use; if a fair
overview of the literature discloses that scientists significant either in number or expertise publicly oppose [the
reliability of a particular methodology], the court may
safely conclude that there is no such consensus at the
96
present time.
Under this fair overview approach, peer review is an indispensable element of the "general acceptance" standard adopted
in Christophersen. Expert opinions based upon methodologies
which have not been critiqued and accepted by a consensus of the
scientific community in the published literature are unreliable and
inadmissible. Indeed, the Christophersen court foreshadowed this
rule by stressing that "[a]ll Dr. Miller had was a scientific hunch,
which as far as the record shows, no one else shares."9 7 This is a
critical distinction from Paoli, where peer review is, at best, only
one of many factors in the trial court's "accuracy" analysis. 98
Although the Fifth Circuit may be considerably slower to admit evidence based on novel techniques after Christophersen, this
cautious approach is based on a realistic evaluation of the effect of
expert testimony on jurors. Other Frye jurisdictions have stressed
the benefits of this approach:
"There has always existed a considerable lag between
advances and discoveries in scientific fields and their acceptance as evidence in a court proceeding." Several
reasons founded in logic and common sense support a
posture of judicial caution in this area. Lay jurors tend
to give considerable weight to "scientific" evidence
when presented by "experts" with impressive credentials. We have acknowledged the existence of a
misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a new
scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental
nature."9 9
Given the Fifth Circuit's traditional skepticism and concerns that
96. Id. at 797.
97. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115 (emphasis added).
98. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 857.
99. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976) (citations omitted); see
also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (that Frye standard retards admissibility of scientific evidence is not unwarranted cost).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol4/iss1/2

16

Faulk: The Unanswered Questions of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.

1993]

CHRISTOPHERSEN V. ALLIED-SIGNAL CORP.

scientific evidence be evaluated in a rational manner, its cautious
insistence on the Frye test is understandable.
Unfortunately, neither of these cases attracted the attention
of the United States Supreme Court. In view of this difficult situation, the trial courts of this nation are justifiably confused about
the standards for admitting scientific evidence. Moreover, the
state courts of many jurisdictions will continue to march to their
own drummer, often surpassing Paoli in their zeal for compensating plaintiffs.' 00 Paraphrasing Christophersen's dissent, the trial
bench should not be forced to decide these difficult cases while
the larger issues remain in conflict because of Supreme Court indifference.' 0 ' It is time for the high court to resolve this confusing situation once and for all.
VII.

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in Christophersen.10 2
All in all, this decision is not surprising. Because of its limited
record, Christophersen was not the ideal case for further review.
Given the Supreme Court's ruling, it is vitally important for counsel to appreciate the differences between Paoli and Christophersen
and understand the practical problems presented by their holdings. Since the Supreme Court has elected to allow this confusing
situation to continue, practitioners who apply these cases must
have a fundamental appreciation of their respective requirements.
As a practical matter, the differences between the Third and
Fifth Circuits' decisions in Paoli and Christophersencan be traced to
fundamental disagreements regarding the need to safeguard juries from questionable expert opinions. These disagreements do
not, however, preclude defense counsel from making appropriate
challenges to unreliable scientific proof. Rather, they simply illustrate the need for counsel to design their challenges in accordance with each circuit's perspective.
In both circuits, for example, counsel may challenge expert
opinions because they are based on inaccurate or incomplete
facts. In a toxicology context, opinions may be unreliable if they
inaccurately or incompletely consider: the levels and durations of
exposure, the presence and potential antagonistic effects of other
100. See, e.g., Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991)

(permitting expert testimony based on methodology that is sufficiently factual
and has scientific underpinnings to expert's theory of causation).
101. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1137-38.
102. 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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toxic substances in the environment, the relative toxicities of
those substances, and other critical toxicologic information. In
an epidemiology context, opinions may be unreliable if they fail
to consider and account for confounding factors, such as the
existence of conditions or diseases capable of producing similar
conditions, prescription drug history, residential histories, age,
sex, race, and prior occupational histories. For example, a study
designed to explore the relationship between asbestos exposure
and lung cancer may be factually unreliable if it fails to consider
the effect of smoking on the study groups. Since smoking profoundly influences the rate of lung cancer, no reliable conclusions
can be made if the participants' smoking history is unknown.
Although both circuits also permit challenges to opinions
based upon unreliable methodologies, the Third Circuit requires
a substantially stronger showing. Although a methodology is not
inadmissible merely because it is not "generally accepted" by a
consensus of the scientific community, the lack of "general acceptance" is still an important factor in the Paoli analysis. More
importantly, however, defense counsel must objectively demonstrate that the methods used by the experts do not predictably
produce accurate results.
Such challenges must focus on an opinion's lack of objectivity. Experts who base their opinions on subjective assumptions,
such as the assumption that there is no safe level of exposure to a
carcinogen, may face serious obstacles in the Third Circuit. Typically, the "no safe level" theory asserts that since science has not
determined safe levels of exposure, it must be presumed that
there are no such levels. Under this theory, brief low-level exposures to carcinogens are deemed sufficient to cause disease. Such
a presumption fails to meet the Paoli criteria because it impermissibly shifts the burden of proof. Under Paoli, as well as in all
other civil courts, the burden remains on the plaintiff to show that
his disease was actually caused by low-level exposure.' 0 3 If the
expert's opinion is based upon a "no safe level" assumption,
rather than an objective analysis, his methodology is fatally flawed
and the opinion is probably unreliable.
Alternatively, defense counsel may challenge opinions by asserting that "a reliable methodology was so altered as to skew the
methodology itself."' 04 For example, an expert opinion is not
admissible simply because it relies upon an accepted methodol103. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 860-62.
104. Id. at 858.
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ogy, such as epidemiology. If the expert refuses to accept the requirement that epidemiological opinions must be based upon
statistically significant associations, he has altered the methodology and produced unreliable results. Similarly, if an expert offers
a toxicological opinion, but refuses to accept the importance of
dosage and duration of exposure in that discipline, the methodology has been skewed and the opinion is unreliable. Since many
outrageous causation opinions depart substantially from standard
toxicologic and epidemiologic principles, even Paoli would preclude expert opinions which do not apply standard principles.
These examples illustrate that Paoli has not raised insurmountable obstacles to scientific evidence challenges. Rather, together with Christophersen, the Paoli court focuses upon the
expert's reasoning process, rather than the subjective outrageousness of the ultimate opinions. Although the Third Circuit
requires a more detailed showing than the Fifth Circuit, defense
counsel may still attack unreliable scientific proof by creatively tailoring their objections and examinations to reveal fatal inaccuracies or subjectivities.
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